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Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed
Network

Abstract. A local public-good game played on directed networks is analyzed. The model
is motivated by one-way ﬂows of hydrological inﬂuence between cities of a river basin that
may shape the level of their contribution to the conservation of wetlands. It is shown that
in many (but not all) directed networks, there exists an equilibrium, sometimes socially
desirable, in which some stakeholders exert maximal eﬀort and the others free ride. It is
also shown that more directed links are not always better. Finally, the model is applied
to the conservation of wetlands in the Gironde estuary (France).
Keywords: common-pool resource; digraph; cycle; independent set; empirical example.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72, D85, H41.
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1

Introduction

In local public-good games played on networks, actions are assumed to be strategic substitutes. 1 Network games of strategic substitutes have the property that an action of an
individual reduces the marginal payoﬀ of his neighbors, i.e. each individual is less willing
to exert a positive eﬀort when he sees that his neighbors are doing so. There is a growing
literature on network games with strategic substitutes (Ballester et al., 2006; Bramoullé
and Kranton, 2007; Corbo et al., 2007; Ballester and Calvó-Armengol, 2009; Galeotti et
al., 2010). However, one aspect that eluded the attention of this literature is the nature
of network links. In this paper, we focus on directed links. 2
Our investigation was motivated by eﬀorts to conserve wetlands. We chose to model
the eﬀort to conserve wetlands as a means of investigating directed network links. Stakeholders (e.g. cities) choose the amount of eﬀort that they are willing to expend on conserving wetlands. However, the results cannot be taken in isolation because there are often
directed ﬂows of hydrological inﬂuence that link cities together. When a city makes an
eﬀort to conserve wetlands, areas that are downstream of the water ﬂow beneﬁt. Herein,
a model of common-pool resource (CPR) conservation in a natural directed network is
constructed. We examine the incentive to conserve a CPR that is non-excludable 3 along
natural one-sided links. 4
1

See Jackson (forthcoming) for an overview of social networks and economic applications, with respect
to (a) how they inﬂuence social and economic activity, and (b) how they can be modeled and analyzed.
2
Directed networks have been essentially analyzed in network formation games. For instance, Bala and
Goyal (2000) model the network formation process as a noncooperative game and study both directed
links and undirected links. Dutta and Jackson (2000) explore the question of endogenous formation,
stability, and eﬃciency for directed communication networks. Johari et al. (2006) analyze a situation in
which bilateral negotiation may result in a contractual agreement between two agents to form a directed
link.
3
Non-excludability means that no one can be eﬀectively excluded from using the resource.
4
Examples also include ﬂows of polluted water between plots of an irrigated perimeter. When a
farmer makes an eﬀort to reduce his use of chemicals and fertilizers, his downstream successors beneﬁt.
Rivers and families are other examples of natural directed networks, determined respectively by geological
and biological factors. In all these settings, natural ﬂows and structures can inﬂuence the incentive to
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The directed feature of natural links between stakeholders of a CPR raises a new set
of research questions:
• How does the natural directed structure aﬀect the level and pattern of CPR conservation?
• How do the pattern of directed links shape the eﬀorts that stakeholders exert and
the payoﬀ they can hope to earn?
• How do new directed links - links between cities for example - aﬀect contributions
and welfare?
Herein, these questions are addressed by extending the model developed by Bramoullé
and Kranton (2007). There is a ﬁxed natural structure that is directed. Stakeholders
manage a CPR - wetlands - that is costly to conserve. This CPR is non-excludable
among naturally linked stakeholders. Stakeholders decide how much to contribute to the
conservation of the resource, knowing that the resource is non-excludable in this way. We
also analyze data from the Livenne river basin in the Gironde estuary to examine some
predictions of the theory. 5
Our analysis yields three main insights.
First, directed networks can lead to specialization. In many directed networks, there is
an equilibrium in which some stakeholders contribute to the conservation of the resource
and others free ride completely. This outcome can have welfare beneﬁts, when free riders
are preceded by several contributors.
contribute.
5
Herein, we deliberately look at a complete information setting for one main reason. In the Livenne
river basin application that we investigate empirically, word of mouth communication travels much faster
than actions, so if a stakeholder behaves badly, other stakeholder hear about it quickly.
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Second, not all directed networks lead to specialization. In some directed networks,
there is a unique equilibrium in which all stakeholders contribute to the conservation of
the resource. This outcome arises when stakeholders are linked in a very speciﬁc way.
Finally, having a greater number of directed links is not always better. A new directed
link increases access to the CPR, but also reduces individual incentives to contribute.
Hence, overall welfare can be greater even if there are holes in a directed network.
This paper contributes to several research areas.
First, it introduces the ﬁrst directed network model of CPR conservation. The conservation of wetlands by cities of a river basin provided the primary reason for constructing
the model. The model applies to any CPR that is non-excludable in a natural dimension
and where there are no extraction costs. 6 Related work includes Bramoullé and Kranton
(2007), Corbo et al. (2007) and Galeotti et al. (2010), who study local public goods
that are non-excludable in a geographic or social dimension. More generally, this paper
contributes to the extensive literature on the management of the commons initiated by
Gordon (1954) and deeply discussed, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives,
by Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom et al. (2002). 7 We study the conservation of a CPR embedded in a natural directed network structure. Our innovation is that we add direction
to the links.
Second, the paper contributes to the economic theory of networks. We consider a
game in which agents perform actions that are substitutes for their predecessors’ actions.
We relate the Nash equilibria to two graph-theoretic notions: maximal independent sets
6

See İlkiliç (forthcoming) for a study of the extraction game played on (undirected) networks, where
links connect agents (cities) with sources and agents decide how much resource units (water) to draw
from each source they are connected to. Herein, we focus on the actual resource system itself, which may
be jointly used. See Walker et al. (1990) for more detailed information on this distinction.
7
See Seabright (1993) for a survey of the literature on the management of the commons.
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and Hamiltonian cycles. An independent set of a directed graph is a set of agents such
that no two agents who belong to the set are adjacent, i.e. there are no links connecting
the two. 8 We show that equilibria where some agents contribute and other agents free
ride often, but not always, exist and correspond to this structural property of a directed
graph. A cycle in a directed graph is a directed sequence of linked agents, in which all
arcs are traversed in their prescribed directions and every agent appears at most once,
except for the ﬁrst and the last agents, who coincide. 9 We show that the existence of
equilibria where some agents contribute and other agents free ride is closely related to the
non-existence of a cycle in directed graphs.
Finally, this paper has common features with the branch of the literature on networks
that aims at identifying the eﬀects of individuals’ neighborhood patterns on behavior and
outcomes. 10 Our analysis suggests that stakeholders who have active predecessors should
have high beneﬁts but exert little eﬀort. We also expect stakeholders who have prominent
natural positions to bear less of the eﬀort costs, and instead to rely on other stakeholders’
eﬀorts. Using data from the Livenne river basin of the Gironde estuary, we examine some
results of the model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present
the model. In Section 3, we study the Nash equilibria of the game. In Section 4, we
derive conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria. In Section 5, we study the stable
equilibria of the game. In Section 6, we study economic welfare for a given directed graph;
8

See Ore (1962), pp. 210-214.
See Ore (1962), pp. 22-23.
10
We can ﬁnd applications in many areas of economics. For instance, Bala and Goyal (1998) analyze how
the (ﬁxed) structure of neighborhoods in a society eﬀects how information is generated and disseminated.
Morris (2000) analyzes a process of behavior contagion in a (ﬁxed) network. Corominas-Bosch (2004)
analyzes bargaining between buyers and sellers who are connected by a (ﬁxed) network. Acemoglu and
Ozdaglar (2007) analyze price competition among service providers in a (ﬁxed) congested network.
9
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then, in Section 7, we ask how changing the directed graph structure can aﬀect welfare.
In Section 8, we examine a natural directed network in the Livenne river basin of the
Gironde estuary. Section 9 concludes. The proofs are given in the Appendix.

2

The model

There are n cities and the set of cities is N = {1, ..., n}. There is a CPR (wetlands)
that can be jointly used by cities and we note ei ∈ [0, +∞) city i’s level of eﬀort to
conserve the CPR. We assume that the individual cost of eﬀort can be represented by
a twice diﬀerentiable cost function c (e). An eﬀort proﬁle of all cities is denoted by
e = (e1 , ..., en ).
Cities are arranged in a directed network, which we represent as a ﬁnite directed graph
(digraph) g. We assume that gij = 1 if city j beneﬁts naturally and directly from the
results of city i’s eﬀort, and gij = 0 otherwise. Due to the fact that links between cities
are directed, gij ̸= gji . Given that city i knows the results of her own eﬀort, we set gii = 1.
Thus, the digraph that represents the directed network is formed by a ﬁnite set of vertices
(the cities) and a ﬁnite set of arcs (the directed links) that connect, in an ordered way,
some pairs of vertices. 11
Let Nis = {j ∈ N \i : gij = 1} denote the set of cities connected to i that beneﬁt
directly from the results of city i’s eﬀort, which we call city i’s successors. Let Nip =
{j ∈ N \i : gji = 1} denote the set of cities connected to i that do not beneﬁt directly
s
from the results of city i’s eﬀort, which we call city i’s predecessors. We note d+
i = |Ni |
p
the out-degree of i, i.e. the number of arcs having i as initial extremity, and d−
i = |Ni | the
11

In our case study about the wetlands of the Gironde estuary, the directed links represent natural ﬂows
of hydrological inﬂuence that link cities together. This naturally directed network structure is illustrated
in Section 8.
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in-degree of i, i.e. the number of arcs having i as ﬁnal extremity. City i’s neighborhood is
deﬁned as herself, her set of successors, and her set of predecessors: i.e. i ∪ Nis ∪ Nip .
We assume that each city receives beneﬁts from her own and her predecessors’ eﬀort.
This means that eﬀorts are supposed to be substitutable. We assume that each city
receives beneﬁts according to a twice diﬀerentiable strictly concave beneﬁt function b (e)
where b (0) = 0, b′ > 0 and b′′ < 0. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that eﬀorts
are perfectly substitutable, that cities are homogeneous in that the CPR produces similar
beneﬁts to all cities and the costs of eﬀort are identical, and the individual marginal cost
of eﬀort is constant and equal to c. A city i’s payoﬀ can then be written as follows:

Ui (e; g) = b (ei + ēi ) − cei

where ēi =

∑
j∈Nip

ej denotes the total eﬀort of city i’s predecessors. 12 We specify the

following game. Given a directed natural structure g, cities simultaneously choose the
amount of eﬀort that they will expend (henceforth, eﬀort levels). For a given eﬀort proﬁle
e, each city i earns payoﬀs Ui (e; g). We analyze pure strategy Nash equilibria, due to the
fact that there are no mixed strategy equilibria because the beneﬁt function is concave and
costs are linear. In the following analysis, we study how network structure, in particular
its directed characteristic, inﬂuences equilibrium eﬀort levels.
12

Note that the model with imperfect substitutability, heterogenous cities, and nonlinear cost of eﬀort
should be written as follows:
Ui (e; g) = bi (ei + λēi ) − ci (ei )
where λ ∈ [0; 1] is a parameter which denotes the degree of substitutability between eﬀorts.
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3

Equilibrium contributions

Firstly, we characterize Nash equilibria. Let e∗ denote the individual eﬀort level at which
the marginal beneﬁt equals the marginal cost: b′ (e∗ ) = c. Given b (.) is strictly concave,
an eﬀort level e∗ > 0 exists and is well-deﬁned as long as b′ (0) > c. Each city chooses her
eﬀort level by playing her best response to the eﬀort level played by her predecessors. An
eﬀort proﬁle e is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for every city i:



 ei = 0

if ēi > e∗



 ei = e∗ − ēi otherwise
Cities want to exert eﬀort as long as their total beneﬁts are less than b (e∗ ). If the
beneﬁts they acquire from their predecessors are more than (or equal to) b (e∗ ), they exert
no eﬀort. If the beneﬁts they acquire from their predecessors are less than b (e∗ ), they
exert a positive eﬀort until their beneﬁts reach b (e∗ ).
In this game, eﬀort levels are perfectly substitutable. The more eﬀort a city’s predecessors exert, the less a city exerts herself. As in the undirected framework, three equilibrium
proﬁles may emerge. There may exist a specialized proﬁle in which every city either exerts
the maximum amount of eﬀort 13 or exerts no eﬀort: for every city i ∈ N , either ei = e∗ or
ei = 0. There may exist a distributed proﬁle in which every city exerts a strictly positive
eﬀort that is less than the maximum amount of eﬀort: for every city i ∈ N , 0 < ei < e∗ .
Finally, there may exist an hybrid proﬁle that falls between the specialized proﬁle and the
distributed proﬁle: for every city i ∈ N , 0 6 ei 6 e∗ . The following example illustrates
the diﬀerences between these diﬀerent types of Nash equilibria in a directed network.
13

In this case, a city would be called a specialist. See Bramoullé and Kranton (2007).
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e*/2

e*/2

e*-k

e*/2

(a)

k

k

e*-k

0

e*

e*

0

(b)

e*/2

e*/2

0

e*/2

(c)

Figure 1: Nash equilibria in simple digraphs

Example 1. Nash equilibria in a directed network. Figure (1) shows three simple
directed graphs. The triangle shown in (a) admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium given by the proﬁle e = (e∗ /2, e∗ /2, e∗ /2). The quadrangle shown in (b) admits a
continuum of distributed Nash equilibria given by the proﬁle e = (k, e∗ − k, k, e∗ − k),
∀k ∈ ]0; e∗ [, and two specialized equilibria (when k = 0 or e∗ ). The digraph shown in (c)
admits an hybrid Nash equilibrium given by the proﬁle e = (0, e∗ /2, e∗ /2, e∗ /2).

4

The existence of Nash equilibria

We now derive conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in a directed network.
We ﬁrst focus on the existence of distributed equilibria. Then, we analyze specialized
equilibria.

4.1

Distributed equilibria

Firstly, we identify an important characteristic of digraphs that do not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium. Then, we point out important digraphs in which we are able
to count the distributed equilibria, using concepts from graph theory: the path, the cycle
and the Hamiltonian digraph.
10
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A path in a digraph is a directed sequence of vertices linked between each other by
arcs. A path is simple if every vertex appears at most once and it is closed if its last
vertex is also its ﬁrst vertex. A cycle in a digraph is a simple closed path: it is a directed
sequence of vertices linked between each other by arcs, in which every vertex appears at
most once, except for the ﬁrst and the last vertices, which coincide. A sequence of vertices
{a0 , a1 , ..., ak−1 , ak } of a digraph is thus called a cycle if a0 , a1 , ..., ak−1 are distinct vertices
and a0 = ak . Note also that a cycle is called Hamiltonian if it goes through every vertex
of the digraph. A digraph that contains a Hamiltonian cycle is called a Hamiltonian
digraph. 14
In numerous digraphs, there exists one or several agents whose in-degree is identical
and equal to one. The case of a digraph containing a cycle is a natural example. Nevertheless, in a directed network, at least one of these agents may be connected to another
agent outside the cycle without aﬀecting the presence of the cycle within the digraph.
In order to ensure the presence of a distributed Nash equilibrium in such a digraph, the
direction of the connection outside the cycle is crucial. We then get the following property.

Lemma 1. If a directed network g contains at least one agent that does not possess
any predecessor, then g does not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium.

Proof. All proofs are provided in the appendix.

Lemma 1 entails that there are a lot of digraphs that do not admit any distributed
Nash equilibrium. Note also that a digraph that does not contain a cycle contains at
14

Research has been done on algorithms to list all the elementary cycles in (unweighted) directed
graphs. See e.g. Weinblatt (1972) or Chen and Ryan (1981).
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least one agent who does not possess any predecessor. This well-known result from graph
theory allow us to state that if a directed network does not contain any cycle, the network
does not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium. The following example illustrates the
concepts of cycle and in-degree of an agent, as long as their connection with the existence
of distributed equilibria.
e*/2

e*/2

e*/2

e*/2

2e*/3

e*/2

(a)

e*/3

2e*/3

e*/3

(b)

e*-k

e*/3

e*-k

k

k

e*-k

(c)

Figure 2: Distributed Nash equilibria in digraphs containing cycle(s)

Example 2. Directed network, cycle, in-degree of agents and existence of distributed
equilibria. Figure (2) shows three cases of a directed network formed by ﬁve cities. The
digraph shown in (a) admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium given by the proﬁle e = (e∗ /2, e∗ /2, e∗ /2, e∗ /2, e∗ /2). Note that in this network, for every city i ∈ N ,
−
d+
i = di = 1. The digraph shown in (b) admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium

given by the proﬁle e = (e∗ /3, e∗ /3, e∗ /3, 2e∗ /3, 2e∗ /3). Note that in this network, there
−
exists one city i ∈ N such that d−
i = 2, while for every other city j ̸= i ∈ N , dj = 1.

The digraph shown in (c) admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria given by the
proﬁle e = (k, e∗ − k, k, e∗ − k, k) and two specialized Nash equilibria (when k = 0 or e∗ ).
Note that in this network, the individual in-degree is equal to one for every city.

We remark that the existence of a distributed Nash equilibrium within a directed
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network depends closely on the individual in-degree of agents, which should generally be
equal to one, except for some speciﬁc cases, as shown in Figure (2) case (b). Suppose
that a digraph veriﬁes this condition for in-degree equality. We can then see that the
number of distributed Nash equilibria within such a directed network is characterized by
the following property.

Lemma 2. Let g be a digraph such that ∀i ∈ N , d−
i = 1. If g contains a cycle formed
by an even number of agents, then g admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria.
If g does not contain any cycle formed by an even number of agents, then g admits a
unique distributed Nash equilibrium.

The following example illustrates the connection between the number of agents within
the cycle of a directed network that admits (at least) one distributed Nash equilibrium
and the number of distributed equilibria.
Example 3. Directed network, cycle, number of agents and number of distributed
equilibria. We consider cases (a) and (b) of Figure (1) as well as case (c) of Figure (2).
Case (a) of Figure (1) shows a Hamiltonian digraph with an odd number of cities in which,
for every city i ∈ N , d−
i = 1, i.e. it shows a Hamiltonian digraph that does not contain
any other cycle. This network admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium. Case (b)
of Figure (1) shows a Hamiltonian digraph with an even number of cities (four cities) in
which, for every city i ∈ N , d−
i = 1. This network admits a continuum of distributed
Nash equilibria. Case (c) of Figure (2) shows a digraph that contains a cycle formed by
an even number of cities (four cities) in which an agent is connected to another agent
outside the cycle, i.e. a network in which for every agent i ∈ N , d−
i = 1. This network
13
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admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria.

4.2

Specialized equilibria

We now derive conditions under which a directed network admits at least one specialized
Nash equilibrium. We ﬁrst identify an important characteristic of digraphs that do not admit any specialized equilibrium. Then, we identify a common property of all the digraphs
that admit at least one specialized Nash equilibrium. Given that eﬀorts are substitutable
only in a unilateral way, we note that a specialized Nash equilibrium is characterized by
the fact that a free rider must always be preceded by at least one specialist. We then
obtain, for a speciﬁc group of digraphs, the following property.

Lemma 3. If a digraph g contains a cycle Γ formed by an odd number of agents where
∀i ⊂ Γ, d−
i = 1, then g does not admit any specialized Nash equilibrium.

We then use a concept from graph theory: the maximal independent set. An independent set I of a digraph g is a set of vertices, no two of which are adjacent, i.e. ∀i, j ∈ I,
gij = gji = 0). An independent set of a digraph g is maximal if and only if adding
every vertex to I makes the set not independent. Thus, given a maximal independent set
I, every agent i ∈ N belongs to I or is connected to an agent who belongs to I. The
population of agents can then be divided in two distinct sets of agents: those belonging
to the maximal independent set I and those belonging to an agent who belongs to I. 15
In so far as a single vertex can constitute a maximal independent set, every digraph
15

The problem of determining the number of (maximal) independent sets has been, and still is, extensively analyzed by mathematicians. See e.g. Zhang (1990) or Ageev (1994) for classic results as well as
Butenko and Trukhanov (2007) for recent results.

14
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g contains at least a maximal independent set. The presence of such a set is a necessary
condition for the presence of a specialized Nash equilibrium within a directed network;
but it not suﬃcient. Consider the case of a Hamiltonian digraph formed by ﬁve agents
that does not contain another cycle. In such a network, there exist several maximal independent sets, each of which is formed by two agents. This digraph does not admit a
specialized Nash equilibrium because, for every maximal independent set, there exists an
agent who does not possess a predecessor that belongs to the maximal independent set.
It follows that the existence of at least one specialized Nash equilibrium within a directed
network is characterized by the following structural property of a digraph.

Proposition 1. A directed network g admits one specialized Nash equilibrium if and
only if g contains a maximal independent set I such that ∀i ∈
/ I, ∃j ∈ I such that gji = 1.

Proposition 1 entails that there exist few digraphs that do not admit a specialized Nash
equilibrium. The following example illustrates the concepts of maximal independent set
and neighborhood, as long as their connection with the existence of specialized Nash
equilibria.
0

0
(a)

0

e*

0

e*

e*

0

(b)

0

e*

e*

0

0

e*

(c)

Figure 3: Specialized Nash equilibria in some digraphs
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Example 4. Maximal independent set, neighborhood and existence of specialized
equilibria. Figure (3) shows three digraphs. The triangle without cycle shown in (a)
admits a unique specialized Nash equilibrium because it contains only one maximal independent set, thereby verifying Proposition 1. The digraph shown in (b) admits a unique
specialized Nash equilibrium. Note that within this digraph, there exists one agent whose
in-degree is equal to zero. The hexagon shown in (c) admits two specialized Nash equilibria. The ﬁrst is shown by Figure (3). The second is such that those who exert a maximum
amount of eﬀort would exert no eﬀort, and conversely.

5

The selection of Nash equilibria

For numerous digraphs, there exists a variety of equilibrium situations. In particular,
a digraph may admit several types of Nash equilibria (distributed, specialized and/or
hybrid), so it is relevant to determine which type of equilibrium is the most likely to
obtain. In such a situation of multiple equilibria, we can try to reduce the number of
equilibria by using a selection criterion founded on a notion of stability based on Nash
tâtonnement (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007; Corbo et al., 2007). 16 We deﬁne fi (e) as city
i’s best response to the proﬁle e and f = (f1 , ..., fn ) as the collection of these individual
best responses. An equilibrium e is stable if and only if there exists ρ > 0 such that for
any vector ε satisfying ∀i, |εi | 6 ρ et ei + εi > 0 the sequence e(n) deﬁned by e(0) = e + ε
(
)
et e(n+1) = f e(n) converges to e. 17
According to this criterion, a Nash equilibrium proﬁle is unstable if and only if there
16

See Funderberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 23-25.
In our context of wetlands, Nash tâtonnement seems to be a natural way to analyze the stability of
equilibria. For example, imagine a new subsidy that would be given to one city of the river basin. This
subsidy could be considered as a perturbation introduced into the network.
17

16
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exists at least one city who modiﬁes her best response following the introduction of perturbation ε within the digraph. By using this notion of Nash tâtonnement, we ﬁrst realize
that some directed networks have no stable equilibria. 18 This is the case when all stakeholders have exactly one predecessor.

Lemma 4. If a directed network g contains a cycle Γ such that ∀i ⊂ Γ, d−
i = 1, then
g does not admit any stable equilibrium.

Lemma 4 entails that a lot of distributed Nash equilibria are unstable. However, this
property cannot be generalized to every distributed equilibria. 19 The following example
illustrates the instability of equilibria admitted by a Hamiltonian digraph that does not
contain any other cycle, i.e. such that ∀i ∈ N , d−
i = 1.
e*-k

k+ε

k

e*-k

Instant (0)

e*-k-ε

k+ε

k

e*-k

e*-k-ε

k+ε

Instant (1)

k+ε

e*-k

Instant (2)

e*-k-ε

k+ε

k+ε

e*-k-ε

Instant (3)

Figure 4: The nondegeneration of a perturbation in a Hamiltonian digraph that does
not contain any other cycle

Example 5. Instability of equilibria of a Hamiltonian digraph in which every agent
possesses an in-degree equal to one. Figure (4) shows a Hamiltonian digraph formed by
18

Another way to test the stability of Nash equilibria would be to make the degree of substitutability
varying at equilibrium. This could be a less restrictive criterion and it might be that some equilibria that
appear unstable in the sense of Nash tâtonnement would be stable. This point is left for further research.
19
Consider a digraph composed by two directed triangles linked by a common vertex, as shown by
Figure (2), case (b). This digraph admits a unique distributed Nash equilibrium that is stable.
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four cities that does not contain another cycle. We know from Lemma 2 that such a digraph admits a continuum of distributed Nash equilibria. We also know from Proposition
1 that such a digraph admits (at least) one specialized Nash equilibrium. If we introduce
a perturbation ε into this directed network, the perturbation never disappears and makes
all cities modify their equilibrium choices.

We have seen that every digraph containing a cycle in which every agent possesses only
one predecessor, i.e. his predecessor within the cycle, does not admit any stable equilibrium. Consider a specialized Nash equilibrium admitted by a digraph that contains a
cycle. Following the introduction of a perturbation ε, every free rider should exert an
eﬀort level equal to 0 + ε, and every specialist should exert an eﬀort level equal to e∗ − ε.
If a free rider i in the cycle possesses two predecessors, at least one of these predecessors
is a specialist; otherwise, Proposition 1 tells us that the digraph does not admit any specialized equilibrium. If i’s second predecessor is also a specialist, then ēi = 2e∗ − 2ε; thus
agent i’s best response is still ei = 0. If i’s second predecessor is not a specialist, then
ēi = e∗ ; thus agent i’s best response is still ei = 0. It is equivalent if agent i possesses
more than two predecessors because at least one of these predecessors is a specialist. We
then get the following property.

Proposition 2. A specialized Nash equilibrium admitted by a directed network g is
stable if and only if, for every cycle contained in g, there exists at least one free rider i
such that d−
i > 2.

Proposition 2 says that a lot of specialized equilibria are stable, but we know from
18
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Lemma 4 that this is not the case for all specialized equilibria. Consider the case of a
Hamiltonian digraph formed by four agents and that does not contain any other cycle.
This digraph admits two specialized Nash equilibria that are not stable, as shown in Figure
(4). Suppose that a new directed link is created between the free riders. A perturbation
introduced in the network will disappear because the best response of the agent who
possesses two predecessors will always be to exert no eﬀort. This example illustrates the
positive eﬀect of new arcs on the stability of specialized equilibria.

6

Welfare analysis

We now evaluate the welfare yielded by diﬀerent allocations of eﬀort within a directed
network. The social value of the networks is measured by a social welfare function that
corresponds to the sum of each individual payoﬀ. Formally, the social welfare function of
proﬁle e for a digraph g can be written as follows:

W (e; g) =

∑

b (ei + ēi ) − c

i∈N

∑

ei

i∈N

where it will be remembered that ēi corresponds to the total eﬀort of city i’s set of
predecessors.

6.1

Eﬃcient allocations

We say that a proﬁle e is eﬃcient for a given directed network g if and only if there
does not exist another proﬁle e’ such that W (e’; g) > W (e; g). In so far as the welfare
function is concave, an eﬃcient proﬁle, for every city i such that ei > 0, must verify
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∂W (e; g)/∂ei = 0; i.e. for all ei > 0:

b′ (ei + ēi ) +

∑

b′ (ej + ēj ) = c

(1)

j∈Nis

where the left hand side corresponds to the marginal social beneﬁt that is derived from
city i’s eﬀort. We note that ēj corresponds to the sum of the eﬀorts of city j’s set of
predecessors. Note also that agent j belongs to city i’s set of successors.
Consider a Hamiltonian digraph formed by n cities and that does not contain any
other cycle. There always exists an eﬃcient proﬁle in which each city chooses to exert the
same level of eﬀort e where e veriﬁes b′ (2e) = c/2. Each city beneﬁts from her own eﬀort
and her predecessor’s eﬀort; hence, each city earns b (2e). Furthermore, the individual
marginal cost is c/2. This allocation of eﬀort solves the ﬁrst-order conditions of welfare
maximization. Given that the welfare function is concave, the allocation of eﬀort must
be eﬃcient.
In some digraphs which do not contain any cycle, there may exist cities that do not
contribute in the eﬃcient allocation. Consider every digraph without a cycle in which the
set of successors of an agent is a strict subset of the set of successors of another agent. In
this context, the agent whose set of successors is the smallest should exert no eﬀort. For
every digraph g with two agents i and j such that i ∪ Nis

j ∪ Njs , ei = 0 in any eﬃcient

proﬁle.
The comparison of the eﬃcient condition (1) to the Nash equilibrium conditions leads
us to notice that cities do not internalize the positive externality their eﬀort produces on
their successors. At the individual level, each city i ∈ N considers only her own marginal
beneﬁts and chooses her eﬀort level such that b′ (ei + ēi ) = c. In this noncooperative

20
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context, the CPR is either underprovided or overpaid. It then follows that no eﬀort
proﬁle that constitutes a Nash equilibrium within a digraph is eﬃcient. We illustrate the
diﬀerence between an eﬃcient allocation and an equilibrium allocation in the following
example.

0

0

0

e

e

0

0

0

0

(a)

e*

e*

0

0

e*

(b)

Figure 5: Eﬃcient allocation vs. equilibrium allocation

Example 6. Eﬃcient vs. equilibrium allocation. Consider the digraph in Figure
(5) which represents two connected communities. In the eﬃcient allocation shown in
(a), cities that linked the two communities make all the contributions to the CPR. The
successors of every other city form a strict subset of the successors of these two cities.
Condition (1) implies that the two cities both exert eﬀort e, such that b′ (2e) + 3b′ (e) = c.
The unique Nash equilibrium admitted by this digraph is diﬀerent from this allocation.
In the equilibrium allocation shown in (b), the city who belongs to the quadrangle and is
connected to the triangle exerts no eﬀort. Thus, eﬀort e∗ should be exerted by two of the
three successors of this city.

6.2

The best Nash equilibrium

Even though no Nash equilibrium that is admitted by a directed network is eﬃcient,
we propose to investigate which equilibria yield the highest welfare. Remember that in
21
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2011

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 535 [2011]

equilibrium, each city receives beneﬁts from an eﬀort level at least equal to e∗ . Thus,
nb (e∗ ) represents the minimum aggregate beneﬁt of each equilibrium proﬁle. However,
there exist some equilibria in which some cities exert no eﬀort but are preceded by several
specialists. Thus, these cities earn more than b (e∗ ). The increase in welfare yielded by
their beneﬁts is equal to

∑
j:ej =0

[b (ēj ) − b (e∗ )] where the sum concerns every city that

exerts no eﬀort. The welfare of an equilibrium can thus be written as follows:

W (e; g) = nb (e∗ ) +

∑

[b (ēj ) − b (e∗ )] − c

j:ej =0

∑

ei

(2)

i

where the second term corresponds to the beneﬁt premium that may arise when the total
eﬀort of the predecessors of a city exceeds e∗ .
Distributed equilibria do not produce beneﬁt premia, while specialized equilibria and
hybrid equilibria may produce such a premium. In Equation (2), we see a trade-oﬀ between
beneﬁt premia and eﬀort costs. It might then be that sometimes, when a digraph admits
both a distributed Nash equilibrium and another type of Nash equilibrium (specialized
or hybrid), the distributed equilibrium would not be preferable in terms of welfare. We
illustrate the emergence of beneﬁt premia within a digraph in the following example.

e*/2

k

0

e*/2

e*-k

0

e*/2

e*-k

(a)

k

(b)

Figure 6: Some digraphs producing a beneﬁt premium
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Example 7. Specialized equilibria, hybrid equilibria and beneﬁt premium. Figure
(7) shows two digraphs. The digraph shown in (a) admits a unique hybrid Nash equilibrium. According to Equation (2), the welfare produced by this equilibrium is equal to
4b (e∗ ) + [b (3e∗ /2) − b (e∗ )] − 3ce∗ /2. The term between brackets corresponds to the beneﬁt premium produced by this hybrid Nash equilibrium, which beneﬁts the city outside the
cycle. The digraph shown in (b) admits two specialized Nash equilibria and a continuum
of hybrid Nash equilibria. Consider ﬁrst the specialized equilibrium where k = e∗ . The
welfare of this equilibrium is equal to 5b (e∗ ) + [b (2e∗ ) − b (e∗ )] − 2ce∗ . The term between
brackets corresponds to the beneﬁt premium produced by this specialized Nash equilibrium, which beneﬁts the city outside the cycle. Consider now the hybrid equilibrium where
k = e∗ /2. The welfare of this equilibrium is equal to 5b (e∗ ) + [b (3e∗ /2) − b (e∗ )] − 2ce∗ .
The term between brackets corresponds to the beneﬁt premium produced by this hybrid
Nash equilibrium, which beneﬁts the city outside the cycle. We note that, in terms of
welfare, the specialized equilibrium where k = e∗ produces the highest beneﬁt premium
and is thus preferable to any other Nash equilibria admitted by this digraph.

7

The eﬀects of new directed links

In the preceding section, we identiﬁed the Nash equilibria of a directed network that yield
the highest aggregate welfare. We now analyze the eﬀects on welfare of changes within
the digraph itself. We examine the eﬀects in term of welfare of adding a new arc within
a given digraph.
We consider changes that appear in the set of Nash equilibria when a new directed
link is created. We say that an equilibrium proﬁle e is a second-best equilibrium for a
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given digraph g if and only if there does not exist any other equilibrium proﬁle e’ such
that W (e’; g) > W (e; g). We consider a digraph g and two agents i and j who are not
connected in g. We denote by g + ij the digraph obtained by connecting i towards j in
g. We consider that the directed link induces a loss in welfare when the level of welfare
of the second-best equilibrium for digraph g + ij is lower than that for g. We illustrate
the positive and negative eﬀects of a new directed link in the following example.

0

0

0

e*

0

e*

0

0

e*

0

(a)

e*

0

0

e*

(b)
0

0

0

e*

e*

0

0

(c)

Figure 7: Connecting two digraphs

Example 8. Positive and negative eﬀects of new directed links. We consider the two
digraphs of case (a) in Figure (7). This ﬁgure shows the unique second-best equilibrium
admitted by this directed network. In this case, the overall welfare is equal to 7b (e∗ )−2ce∗ .
If we create a new directed link from the specialist of the triangle towards the specialist
of the quadrangle, as shown by case (b) in Figure (7), the initial equilibrium is modiﬁed.
This new directed link modiﬁes the overall welfare by decreasing it, since it takes the
value of 7b (e∗ ) − 3ce∗ . On the other hand, if we create a new directed link between
24
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the specialist of the triangle and a free rider of the quadrangle, as shown by case (c) in
Figure (7), the initial equilibrium is not modiﬁed. However, the overall welfare increases
because it now becomes equal to b (2e∗ ) + 6b (e∗ ) − 2ce∗ . In this case, a free rider has two
predecessors who are specialists. The welfare of this city increases because the total eﬀort
of her predecessors is now equal to 2e∗ .

8

Numerical example

Environmental applications in network analysis are just beginning to appear, and so
far have focused on understanding characteristics of social networks that increase the
likelihood of collective action and successful natural resource management (Schneider et
al., 2003; Bodin and Crona, 2009). Moreover, by linking well-known concepts of social
network analysis to issues and theories found in the literature on resource management,
these applications have tried to show how knowledge gained from analyzing the social
networks of stakeholders can be used to select stakeholders for participation in initiatives
for the management of natural resources (Prell et al., 2008; Prell et al., 2009). Though
these studies have been quite appealing with respect to the analysis of the eﬃciency of
the governance of common-pool resources, they lack economic intuition because they do
not identify the eﬀects of agents’ neighborhood patterns, i.e. their social network, on
behavior and outcomes.
Our case study for the model developed herein is the conservation of wetlands by cities
of a river basin linked by ﬂows of hydrological inﬂuence. We focus on the Livenne river
basin, located in the Gironde estuary (France). This river basin contains 24 cities. None
of these cities has a population of more than 3500 citizens and only seven have more
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Figure 8: The links of hydrological inﬂuence between cities of the Livenne river basin

than 1000 citizens. Their surface area varies from 245 to 3743 hectares. The links of
hydrological inﬂuence between cities of the Livenne river basin are shown in Figure 8.
From Figure 8, we can draw any random representation of the Livenne directed network.
We use the software program Pajek 20 to achieve this (see Figure 9).
We then calculate the in-degree and out-degree indices for every city of the network.
These results are reported in Table 1. Nine cities have an in-degree equal to zero. This
means that these cities have no predecessor. Applying Lemma 1 to this context, we
know that the Livenne directed network does not admit any distributed equilibrium. It
is interesting to note that only two cities have an out-degree equal to zero. This means
that only two cities have no successor. We also note that a large majority of cities has
20

http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php

26
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper535

26

Richefort and Point: Governing a Common-Pool Resource in a Directed Network

Figure 9: Random draw of the Livenne directed network

an out-degree equal to one. The city with the highest out-degree, Reignac, also has the
highest in-degree. All ﬂows are directed except for three, which are two-way. There are
several paths in the network, and one cycle. 21
The Livenne directed network admits two specialized equilibria and a continuum of
hybrid equilibria. Nevertheless, only two cities, Braud-et-Saint-Louis and Saint-Cierssur-Gironde, could exert diﬀerent equilibrium eﬀort. Moreover, eight cities have a unique
best-response, which is to free ride. According to Proposition 2, there are Nash equilibria
that are stable. We also note that ﬁve cities would get a beneﬁt premium, according
to their position in the network. It is interesting to note that the city with the highest
in-degree and out-degree would get the highest beneﬁt premium. However, a majority of
cities (15) would exert maximal eﬀort without getting any premium.

21

Saugon - Générac - Campugnan - Reignac - Saugon.
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Table 1: Individual statistical measures of the Livenne directed network
City

Saint-Androny
Saint-Genès-de-Blaye
Fours
Mazion
Anglade
Eyrans
Cartelègue
Campugnan
Générac
Saint-Paul
Saint-Christoly-de-Blaye
Saint-Savin
Saugon
Reignac
Donnezac
Marcillac
Saint-Aubin-de-Blaye
Braud-et-Saint-Louis
Etauliers
Saint-Caprais-de-Blaye
Saint-Palais
Saint-Ciers-sur-Gironde
Pleine-Selve
Saint-Girons-d’Aiguevives
1

9

Indegree

Outdegree

Equilibrium
eﬀort

Beneﬁt
premium

2
0
1
0
2
2
2
1
3
0
1
0
0
5
0
1
3
3
2
0
1
3
0
0

0
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
4
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

e∗
e∗
0
e∗
0
e∗
0
e∗
0
e∗
0
e∗
e∗
0
e∗
e∗
0
e∗ − k 1
e∗
e∗
0
k1
e∗
e∗

e∗
e∗
2e∗
4e∗
e∗
-

∀k ∈ [0; e∗ ]

Conclusion

We have presented a model of CPR conservation in a directed network. In this model,
there is a ﬁxed natural structure that connects stakeholders, and stakeholders choose how
much to contribute to the conservation of the CPR, which is non-excludable and can be
jointly used. The game is noncooperative, i.e. actions are strategic substitutes. This
theoretical work was motivated by a desire to understand the conservation of wetlands in
a river basin of the Gironde estuary, where stakeholders (cities) are connected by ﬂows of
hydrological inﬂuence. Due to the fact that these ﬂows are almost always one-way, our
model was also motivated by a desire to understand directed networks.
28
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By adding a direction to the links, our model extends the local public goods game
played on networks that is developed in Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). We ﬁnd two fundamental diﬀerences between our model and that of Bramoullé and Kranton. First, those
authors show that every undirected network admits a specialized equilibrium, while our
model shows that many, but not all, directed networks admit a specialized equilibrium.
Second, while those authors show that no distributed equilibrium is stable, our model
shows that some directed networks admit a distributed equilibrium that is stable. In contrast, the welfare analysis reveals three main similarities with the undirected framework.
First, we ﬁnd that no Nash equilibrium is eﬃcient. Second, we ﬁnd that beneﬁt premia
may appear in directed networks in which free riders are preceded by many contributors.
Finally, we show that structural holes in directed networks may sometimes be beneﬁcial
to society as a whole.
A useful direction for further research would be to investigate how the nature of links
aﬀects behavior and outcomes. In this regard, the eﬀect of weak ties in comparison with
strong ties was ﬁrst pointed out by Granovetter (1973). In the example of wetlands that
we used when developing our model, it is very clear that ﬂows of hydrological inﬂuence
vary in their intensity. This fact suggests to study weighted directed networks, which may
provide more precise results concerning the existence of Nash equilibria. A further issue
for investigation, which is related to the ﬁrst, is how ﬂows vary over time in addition to
varying in their intensity. Finally, it would also be pertinent to examine outcomes if it
is assumed that eﬀort substitutability is imperfect and heterogenous among stakeholders
because this could provide a more intuitive approach for testing the stability of Nash
equilibria.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that in a digraph g, there exists an agent i ∈ N such that
d−
i = 0. Due to the fact that agent i has no predecessor, ēi = 0. Note that in equilibrium,
agent i chooses her level of eﬀort ei such that b′ (ei + ēi ) = b′ (e∗ ) = c. It follows that
ei = e∗ , i.e. agent i always chooses to exert the maximum level of eﬀort. All equilibrium
proﬁles admitted by g contain at least an agent who exerts a maximal level of eﬀort;
hence, g does not admit any distributed Nash equilibrium.



Proof of Lemma 2. Let g be a digraph in which ∀i ∈ N , d−
i = 1, i.e. g contains a
unique cycle or several disconnected cycles.
Suppose that g is a Hamiltonian digraph, i.e. that ∀i ∈ N , d+
i = 1 and the cycle
is unique. Assume that an agent i chooses to exert an eﬀort level ei = k such that
k ∈ ]0, e∗ [. Her successor, agent i + 1, will choose to exert an eﬀort level e(i+1) such that
ei + e(i+1) = e∗ , so e(i+1) = e∗ − k. In the same way, the successor of agent i + 1 will choose
to exert an eﬀort level equal to k, and so on until the predecessor of agent i, i.e. agent
i − 1. If agent i − 1 chooses to exert an eﬀort level equal to e∗ − k, g will be composed of
an even number of agents. In this case, we obtain ei + e(i−1) = e∗ , ∀k ∈ [0, e∗ ]. If agent
i − 1 chooses to exert an eﬀort level equal to k, then g is composed of an odd number of
agents. In this case, ei + e(i−1) = e∗ if and only if k = e∗ /2.
Suppose now that g contains a cycle Γ in which there exists (at least) an agent j ⊂ Γ
who represents the initial extremity of one (or several) path, i.e. ∃j ∈ N such that
d+
j ̸= 1. Thus, agent j has (at least) two successors. Every successor of agent j outside
the cycle will choose to exert an eﬀort level identical to the successor of agent j within
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the cycle (because under our initial assumption, every agent has only one predecessor).
Thus, whatever the size and the number of paths connected to Γ, the number of equilibria
admitted by g depends only on the number of agents that belong to Γ.



Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 2 tells us that if a directed network g verifying the
assumption ∀i ∈ N , d−
i = 1, contains a cycle composed of an odd number of agents, then
the unique Nash equilibrium admitted by g is a distributed Nash equilibrium in which
∀i ∈ N , ei = e∗ /2. 

Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that a specialized proﬁle e is a Nash equilibrium
of a directed network g. Thus, for every agent i and j belonging to the set of specialists
Ie , ei = ej = e∗ . This implies that gij = gji = 0, because otherwise, e∗ is not their best
response. Thus Ie is an independent set.
Consider an independent set of specialists Ie that is not maximal. By deﬁnition, there
exists a set of agents J ∈ N such that J ∪ Ie is independent. However, ∀j ∈ J, ej = 0
cannot be a best response because agent j is not preceded by one (or several) specialists.
Thus Ie is a maximal independent set.
Suppose now that ∀j ∈ Ie , ∃i ∈
/ Ie , such that gji = 0. As agent i is not preceded by
one (or several) specialist, ei = 0 is not her best response. On the other hand, if ∀i ∈
/ Ie ,
∃j ∈ Ie , such that gji = 0, then free riders are all preceded by a specialist and exert their
best response.



Proof of Lemma 4. Let g be a digraph containing a cycle Γ in which ∀i ⊂ Γ, d−
i = 1.
We consider an equilibrium such that ∀i ⊂ Γ, ei = fi (e) where fi (e) represents the
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best response of individual i to the proﬁle e. We note f = (f1 , ..., fn ) the collection of best
responses of every agent i belonging to Γ. We deﬁne a perturbation ε such that ∀i ∈ N ,
εi = ρ where ρ is a small positive number. We introduce the perturbation in the cycle
Γ, i.e. e(0) = e + ε. At time 0, there exists an agent i belonging to Γ whose eﬀort level
is equal to e′i = ei + εi . At the next time, the successor of this agent, marked i + 1, will
reduce the amount of eﬀort she exerts because from now on, ēi+1 = ei + εi . Thus, every
agent in the cycle reﬂects the perturbation on her own eﬀort level, until the predecessor
of agent i, marked i − 1. Lemma 2 tells us that if the number of agents belonging to Γ is
even, then e′i−1 = e∗ − e′i , i.e. a new equilibrium arises and the sequence e(n) will never
converge to e. If the number of agents belonging to Γ is odd, then e′i−1 = e′i . Agent i will
be led to modify her eﬀort level by choosing e′′i = ei − ε. The successor of agent i will
then modify her eﬀort level, and so on. The network no longer admits an equilibrium and


the sequence e(n) will never converge to e.

Proof of Proposition 2. Let g be a digraph that admits a specialized Nash equilibrium.
We ﬁrst suppose that g does not contain any cycle. Thus, there exists (at least) one
∗
agent i ∈ N , such that d−
i = 0. In equilibrium, the best response of agent i is ei = e .

If we introduce a perturbation ε within the digraph, then the best response of agent i
will always be ei = e∗ . It is the same for every agent who has no predecessor within g.
Furthermore, ∀j ∈ Nid , ej = 0 because in equilibrium, b′ (ej + ēj ) = c, where ēj > ei .
In addition, ∀h ∈ Njd , i.e. contained in the maximal independent set built from agent
i, eh = e∗ , etc. The network always admits the initial specialized equilibrium and the
sequence e(n) will always converge to e.
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We have shown that the specialized Nash equilibrium admitted by a digraph that does
not contain any cycle is stable. Suppose now that g contains one or several cycles. We
know from Lemma 4 that if there exists a cycle Γ such that ∀i ⊂ Γ, d−
i = 1, g does not
admit any stable equilibrium. Assume there exists an agent j ⊂ Γ such that d−
j > 2.
We know from Proposition 1 that one of the two predecessors of agent j is inevitably a
specialist. Without perturbation, ēj = e∗ and ej = 0. With a very small perturbation
ε > 0, ēj = (e∗ − ε) + (0 + ε) + ... and ej = 0. The perturbation within Γ will disappear
because of agent j, who does not modify her best response. This logic applies to every
cycle contained within g.
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